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The “hearts and minds” model of combating re-bellions indicates that civilians in civil war the-aters are less likely to support armed opposition
groups if they are satisfied with the provision of public
services and security by the government (Beath, Christia,
and Enikolopov 2012, Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011).
If the government effectively signals that it will address the
grievances of a certain displeased group, then this group
will reward the government with support in return; and
simultaneously, this group will reduce support for in-
surgents, terrorists, and anti-government militias. The
model implies that an unexpected major political event
that increases a group’s expectation of future security and
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public service delivery by the government will be associ-
ated with an increase in support for the government and
a decrease in sympathy for the violent opposition. Iraq’s
recent past offers an example of such a seminal event: the
abrupt announcement of the resignation of Prime Min-
ister Nouri al-Maliki on August 14, 2014, which resulted
in the first transition of the government’s leadership in
8 years and which replaced a divisive leader with a suc-
cessor viewed as less sectarian. This article investigates
the effect of the prime minister’s announced resignation
on Iraqi public attitudes vis-à-vis the government and
violent opposition groups. The study leverages original
data from a national survey conducted in Iraq in the
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summer of 2014 immediately before and after the resig-
nation was announced. It shows that the announcement
of the resignation was associated with a strong decrease
in support for violent opposition groups among Sunni
Arabs, Iraq’s largest minority. The study concludes that
this drop in sympathy is consistent with the explanation
that Sunni Arabs became more optimistic about the fu-
ture provision of key public services and security by the
government. In sum, these results lend strong support
to the argument on public goods, services, and civilian
attitudes derived from the hearts and minds model.
The literature on civil war ascribes a decisive role to
the civilian population. The primary constraints on the
production of insurgent and counterinsurgent violence
are the insurgency’s ability to recruit combatants (Dube
and Vargas 2013) and the willingness of civilians to
share actionable intelligence with counterinsurgency
forces (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011, Kalyvas 2006,
Lyall and Wilson 2009). In a conventional civil war,
the production of direct violence also requires the
cooperation of the local population, which can enable a
group to identify enemies in the areas under its control
(Balcells 2010). While civilians’ collaboration with
combatants is not simply a function of their preferences
(Humphreys and Weinstein 2008, Kalyvas 2006),
civilians’ attitudes vis-à-vis the conflict parties shape
their wartime behavior (Balcells 2010, Wood 2003).
Therefore, understanding popular support for armed
groups “remains a first-order concern” for scholars of
civil war and for policy makers (Shapiro and Fair 2010,
84). According to a recent study, a “near consensus
now exists among practitioners around the notion that
counterinsurgency wars are decided by the relative
success each combatant enjoys in winning support from
the civilian population” (Lyall, Blair, and Imai 2013, 680).
Given the important role of civilians in insurgencies
and conventional civil wars, there is surprisingly little
empirical research investigating public attitudes in con-
flict theaters. A recent survey of political science research
on post-9/11 wars and insurgencies in Afghanistan and
Iraq reveals that only 11 studies analyzed public opin-
ion in these two countries, whereas almost five times as
many examined the wars’ impact on U.S. public atti-
tudes (Mikulaschek and Shapiro 2018). The difficulty of
researching public opinion in war theaters goes a long
way in explaining the striking dearth of knowledge about
civilian attitudes during conflict.
This study empirically investigates Iraqi public at-
titudes vis-à-vis the government and violent opposition
groups in order to examine how major political events af-
fect the attitudes of civilians in rebellious environments.
We exploit a unique research design opportunity that
stems from the resignation of the Iraqi prime minister
while a national survey on civic attitudes and violence
was being administered in Iraq. Al-Maliki was a divi-
sive leader whom many consider to have marginalized
the Sunni Arab minority (see below). This marginaliza-
tion drove many Sunni Arab Iraqis to support armed
opposition groups, including ISIS, which capitalized on
widespread resentment in order to take control of North-
Western Iraq. We show that the announcement of al-
Maliki’s resignation had a strong impact on the attitudes
of the aggrieved. Specifically, the share of Sunni Arabs who
expressed sympathy for armed opposition groups sharply
declined from 52% within 2 weeks before the resignation
was announced to 27% within 2 weeks after the resigna-
tion. We then demonstrate that this fall in sympathy is
linked to improved perceptions of the government’s fu-
ture “performance legitimacy,” not “process legitimacy.”
In other words, in the wake of the announced resignation,
the drop in sympathy was due to the Sunni Arab minority
feeling increasingly optimistic that the new government
would provide the necessary security and public services
to address their grievances, but not necessarily incorpo-
rate this minority group’s voice in the governing process.
These findings have several major implications. First,
many Iraqi Sunni Arabs do not support violent groups
(e.g., ISIS) for purely ideological reasons and are willing
to support a Shia Arab-led government if they expect the
government to improve their plight. Second, leadership
change in civil war countries with a history of personalized
dictatorship can drastically shift mass political attitudes
even when the new head of government is a member
of the same sect, political party, and ruling coalition as
his predecessor, as long as the transition improves public
perceptions of future service delivery to aggrieved com-
munities. Third, while the recent literature shows that
leadership transitions in weakly institutionalized regimes
alter public goods and service provision (Burgess et al.
2015, Hodler and Raschky 2014), this study indicates that
the public’s expectation of such changes triggers a re-
alignment of popular support from violent opposition
groups to the government. Thus, effective signals about
future public service delivery start to at least temporar-
ily win over hearts and minds even before any concrete
policy change.
Theory
What determines civilians’ support for combatants dur-
ing wartime? Recent studies show that civilian attitudes
are responsive to the behavior of warring factions. Pub-
lic opinion research conducted in Afghanistan, Pakistan,
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and the Palestinian Territories indicates that civilian
casualties adversely affect (at least temporarily) popu-
lar perceptions of the perpetrator (Bullock, Imai, and
Shapiro 2011, Jaeger et al. 2012, Lyall, Blair, and Imai
2013). Research on Iraq is consistent with this finding,
as it shows that civilians are less likely to share informa-
tion with the counterinsurgency when the government
inadvertently kills civilians and are more likely to sup-
ply intelligence when the insurgents are responsible for
civilian deaths (Shaver and Shapiro 2016).
Clearly, then, the government’s posture toward civil-
ians influences popular support for warring factions. One
implication is that counterinsurgent forces can buy the
allegiance of civilians by providing aid to them. Beath,
Christia, and Enikolopov (2012) find that an Afghan
government program tasked with delivering services and
with building village-level representative institutions im-
proved economic welfare, attitudes toward the govern-
ment, and perceptions of security. Berman, Shapiro, and
Felter (2011) show that a U.S. reconstruction program
in Iraq, which enabled counterinsurgent commanders to
launch small-scale projects that responded to the needs
of local communities, reduced insurgent attacks because
such provision of public goods incentivized civilians to
share information with the counterinsurgents, thus en-
hancing the latter’s effectiveness. In the Philippines, a
conditional cash transfer program in conflict-affected ar-
eas reduced insurgents’ influence and led to a decrease
in violence (Crost, Felter, and Johnston 2016). On the
other hand, a public works program in India increased
the number of attacks by the police on Maoist insurgents
and triggered retaliatory attacks by Maoists on civilians;
but the authors show that this effect is consistent with
the argument that the government program made civil-
ians more willing to share actionable intelligence with
the police (Khanna and Zimmermann 2015). Similarly,
Crost, Felter, and Johnston (2014) find that the start of a
community-driven development program in the Philip-
pines increased attacks by insurgents, who anticipated
that successful program implementation would weaken
their popular support.
These results on the effect of public goods and
service delivery are consistent with the hearts and
minds model, which conceives of civil conflict as a
competition between the government and its violent
opponents over legitimacy (Berman and Matanock
2015; Mao 1937; Thompson 1966).1 In the words of the
Counterinsurgency Field Manual of the U.S. Army and
1While the notion of winning “hearts and minds” has been used
in various ways, hearts and minds as a theoretical model rests on
three propositions: First, the behavior of warring factions influences
civilian attitudes. Second, civilian attitudes affect civilian actions
Marine Corps (2006, 1–20), counterinsurgent “success
requires the government to be accepted as legitimate by
most of that uncommitted middle, which also includes
passive supporters of both sides.” If the government is
viewed as legitimate by the population the rebels claim
to represent (e.g., a sectarian group), support for the
violent opposition evaporates, and the uprising cannot
be sustained. To win over the hearts and minds of these
civilians, a government confronted with a civil conflict
needs to address their grievances and provide salient
public goods and services such as security and electricity.
This reasoning implies that a major event that improves
perceptions of governance and service provision among
members of the rebellion’s constituency should be
associated with a decrease in support for the violent
opposition. When a government suffers from a legitimacy
deficit, which gave rise to the violent conflict in the first
place, a major reform of the government can strengthen
the latter’s claim to legitimacy (Isaac et al. 2008, 348;
Malkasian 2006). A transition in government leadership
will enhance the government’s legitimacy if the popula-
tion expects the incoming leader to be more willing and
able to deliver services and address grievances. The hearts
and minds model implies that such a change will increase
popular support for the government among aggrieved
parts of the population, and that it will simultaneously
decrease the popularity of armed opposition groups.
Public attitudes will start to change as soon as the
displeased group’s expectations of future governance and
service provision rise. Therefore, a leadership transition
that affects these expectations can shift public support
for the government and the violent opposition even
before the new government implements policy changes.
Key sources of government legitimacy include demo-
cratic or process legitimacy, which is accumulated when
the processes of state decision making correspond to
widely held notions of appropriateness, and output or
performance legitimacy, which accrues to the government
when it provides salient public goods and services (see,
e.g., François and Sud 2006, Lipset 1959, 91).2 A ma-
jor political event in the civil war country can win over
hearts and minds of an aggrieved population by improv-
ing the government’s democratic or performance legiti-
macy or both. The observable implication of an increase
in democratic legitimacy consists of a rise in the per-
ceived ability of citizens to participate in political decision
making following the event. An increase in performance
(e.g., intelligence sharing). Third, civilian actions influence the
course of the conflict. This study tests the first proposition.
2A government is viewed as legitimate when it is believed to have
the right to rule.
776 CHRISTOPH MIKULASCHEK, SAURABH PANT, AND BEZA TESFAYE
legitimacy manifests itself in a surge in popular expec-
tations of future public goods and service provision by
the government. The hearts and minds model implies
that either of these changes in the attitudes of aggrieved
parts of the population will be associated with a decline
in support for armed opposition groups.
The civil war in Iraq is a hard case for testing the
argument that the government can win over the hearts
and minds of the uncommitted middle of the population
the violent opposition claims to represent, because this
conflict is fought along sectarian lines. This implies that
it is more difficult to shift the allegiance of civilians than
it is in ideology-based civil conflicts (Isaac et al. 2008).
If we find evidence in support of our argument even in
the Iraqi context, we thus have reason to believe that
the relationship between public goods, governance, and
popular support for warring factions is even stronger in
civil wars that revolve around ideology.
Context of the Iraqi Prime Minister’s
Resignation
The political developments that surrounded al-Maliki’s
resignation are summarized in the supporting informa-
tion (SI; pp. 1–9) and briefly outlined here due to space
constraints. Al-Maliki became prime minister after the
2005 elections. The alliance that included his party had
its stronghold in Iraq’s predominantly Shiite south. After
2011, al-Maliki gradually marginalized Sunni Arab mem-
bers of his cabinet, tried to arrest the Sunni Arab vice pres-
ident, and neglected to provide Sunni Arabs with basic
public services such as electricity. Protests in predom-
inantly Sunni Arab areas erupted in 2012. During the
first half of 2014, ISIS capitalized on widespread Sunni
Arab frustration when it conquered towns and villages
in Nineveh and other Iraqi provinces with initial sup-
port from Iraqi Sunni Arab tribal groups. In the words of
a former U.S. intelligence officer in Iraq, “the vanguard
is ISIS. The breadth and depth of this is basic Sunnis
who are fed up” (Sullivan and Jaffe 2014). In late June,
the government’s battlefield losses led to calls for lead-
ership change in Iraq. Under intense pressure from the
United States, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and domestic sources,
al-Maliki agreed to resign on August 14, 2014. His an-
nounced successor, Haider al-Abadi, was viewed more
favorably by Sunni Arabs even though he was also a Shia
Arab who belonged to al-Maliki’s party, and Sunni Arab
political parties, clerics, and tribal leaders publicly voiced
support of the leadership transition. Thus, Prime Minis-
ter al-Maliki’s resignation can be seen as a credible signal
that the new Iraqi government was going to address the
grievances of Sunni Arabs. If this is the case, the hearts
and minds model suggests that Iraqi Sunni Arabs should
become less likely to support violent opposition groups in
the wake of the resignation, and that they should also be-
come more optimistic about future government policies.
Research Design
This study relies on design-based causal inference to esti-
mate the effect of the leadership transition on Iraqi Sunni
Arabs, the country’s main displeased minority. In turn,
we summarize the identification strategy, data, measure-
ment, and model specifications.
Identification Strategy and Data
We leverage a unique research design opportunity that
stems from the abrupt resignation of the Iraqi prime min-
ister while a national survey on civic attitudes and conflict
was being administered across Iraq. Respondents who
were interviewed before the announcement of al-Maliki’s
resignation on August 14 form part of the control group,
whereas respondents interviewed after that date are in
the treatment group. The treatment is being aware of
al-Maliki’s announced resignation. As the timing of this
critical event was not influenced by the administration of
the survey, respondents who fell on either side of this date
should not be systematically different, in expectation, be-
cause the order in which the survey was administered
across Iraqi provinces was as-if randomly determined
long before anyone knew whether and when the prime
minister would resign. Figure 1 displays the proportion
of respondents in each governorate who were interviewed
before and after the resignation was announced. Covari-
ate balance analyses reported in the robustness section
confirm that respondents who were interviewed shortly
before the resignation was announced were not system-
atically different from those interviewed soon after this
event on key determinants of political attitudes, such as
age and education level. Therefore, we can estimate the ef-
fect of al-Maliki’s resignation by investigating differences
in attitudes between the two sets of respondents who were
interviewed shortly before or soon after the resignation
was announced.
The survey was administered by 4points, a private
Iraqi survey company, for the humanitarian organization
Mercy Corps. This paper-based survey was administered
in Arabic and Kurdish to a sample that is representative
of 17 of Iraq’s 18 governorates; it could not be conducted
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FIGURE 1 Composition of Sample and Assignment to Treatment
Condition by Governorate
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Note: The panels on the left display the proportion of respondents in three samples that were
interviewed before the prime minister’s resignation was announced; the remaining responses
were gathered after that date. The panels on the right show the number of respondents by
governorate (gray circles) and the share of respondents in each governorate divided by
the proportion of the Iraqi population that lives in this governorate (shade depicts over-
/underrepresentation).
in Nineveh due to the conquest of the province by ISIS.3
The sample size was 5,232, and respondents were chosen
through a multistage cluster sampling method. Samples
were allocated to governorates and districts based on the
3SI Tables 58– 59 provide details on the survey.
probability proportional to size (PPS) approach. Subdis-
tricts were then randomly selected within districts. The
KISH grid method was used to select respondents within
a household.
For the main analyses, we focus solely on the 1,894
survey responses that were collected in August (i.e., about
778 CHRISTOPH MIKULASCHEK, SAURABH PANT, AND BEZA TESFAYE
2 weeks before and after the resignation announcement)
to mitigate the risk that other events confound the estima-
tion of the impact of this event on public attitudes.4 Co-
variate balance tests show that respondents interviewed in
August were not systematically different on any pretreat-
ment covariates from respondents who took the survey in
the same governorate during other months. The results
are generally robust to including all responses provided
within 3 weeks from the date on which the resignation
was announced (increasing the sample by 43%) and to
restricting the analysis to respondents who took the sur-
vey within 2 weeks from that date (shrinking the number
of observations by 10%). Figure 1 displays the distribu-
tion of these three samples by governorate. It indicates
that neither of these samples is nationally representative
because they were generated through the as-if randomly
assigned timing of each interview. Figure 1 also shows that
the composition of the three samples varies considerably,
making it all the more remarkable that they support sim-
ilar results. These results also hold in weighted ordinary
least squares (OLS) models summarized below.
Recent studies use survey experiments (Blair
et al. 2013, Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro 2014) or field
experiments (Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov 2012) to
investigate the determinants of public attitudes toward
violence and militant groups. Though such research
designs have yielded many valuable insights, they cannot
easily estimate the effect of major political events on
civilian attitudes. Seminal events rarely unfold in the
context of randomized experiments, and survey exper-
iments administered after salient events cannot directly
measure changes in public attitudes that are triggered
by those events because these changes materialize across
all treatment conditions. Relying on the research design
opportunity that stems from the unanticipated timing of
the event and the as-if randomly determined scheduling
of each interview before or after this event provides an
attractive alternative identification strategy.
This research design allows us to address three dis-
tinct challenges for public opinion research in conflict
theaters that often lead researchers to conduct survey ex-
periments: safety, social desirability bias, and nonrandom
refusal to participate (Blair et al. 2013, Bullock, Imai, and
Shapiro 2011, Lyall, Blair, and Imai 2013, 682). First, to
ensure the safety of enumerators and respondents, the
survey was not administered in Nineveh, which was con-
4Mutz (2011, 88–89) recommends dropping responses that were
provided at an unreasonable speed. Twenty-seven responses were
discarded since these respondents completed the survey in 12 min-
utes or less (median duration = 35 minutes, mean = 36 minutes),
which makes it inconceivable that they expressed genuine attitudes.
trolled by ISIS.5 Second, the risk of social desirability bias
arises particularly when individuals in conflict theaters are
surveyed in public settings (Lyall, Blair, and Imai 2013,
682). Therefore, enumerators interviewed respondents at
their homes unless interviewees preferred a different lo-
cation; 88% of the interviews were conducted at respon-
dents’ homes, and 54% of the respondents were alone
with the enumerators during the interview. The results
are robust to omitting all interviews that were conducted
outside the respondent’s home or with others present
(see SI Tables 54– 57). To avoid a situation in which re-
spondents believe that future aid receipts depend on their
responses, enumerators were asked not to disclose that
the survey was conducted for Mercy Corps. The robust-
ness section summarizes numerous tests that probe and
rule out bias from social desirability effects. Third, there
is a concern that respondents who refused to answer or
replied that they “don’t know” introduce bias. Those who
chose not to give an informative answer could be sys-
tematically different from those who revealed an attitude.
Nonresponses would only bias the estimated effect of the
prime minister’s resignation if respondents’ choice to an-
swer or to refuse to do so systematically changed after
the resignation was announced. However, the incidence
of “don’t know” or “refused to answer” replies was not
significantly different before and after August 14. More-
over, the probability of nonresponse was associated with
very few pretreatment covariates.6 Consequently, nonre-
sponses should not confound the estimate of the effect of
the prime minister’s resignation.
The announcement of al-Maliki’s resignation would
have the hypothesized impact on Iraqi public attitudes
if two conditions hold. First, the resignation should not
be widely anticipated to occur on or close to August 14.
5Direct questions about sensitive subjects in conflict settings may
pose risks to respondents and enumerators. To conduct the survey
in an ethical manner, Mercy Corps took several steps to mitigate
these risks: It piloted sensitive questions (e.g., on attitudes toward
violent groups) by conducting interviews in two cities, and none of
the interviewees indicated discomfort about answering these ques-
tions. Survey respondents could select the “don’t know” answer
option if they felt uncomfortable expressing an opinion, and they
could choose to “refuse an answer” if they preferred not to express
that they did not have a view. Respondents could also end the sur-
vey at any time. Moreover, the questions on the survey did not ask
respondents to reveal any identifying information. Enumerators
emphasized from the beginning that participation was voluntary,
and they were instructed to conduct interviews in the privacy of
respondents’ homes unless the latter preferred different settings.
Most respondents were alone with enumerators during the inter-
view (see below). Enumerators were chosen based on prior survey
experience, vetted, and trained to ask sensitive questions. The sup-
porting information (pp. 97–99) provides further details.
6See SI Table 49. All models control for the measures that are signifi-
cantly associated with respondents’ choice to express their attitudes.
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Second, Iraqis should not expect al-Maliki’s successor,
al-Abadi, to continue his predecessor’s divisive policies.
News reports written shortly before and after the resig-
nation suggest that both conditions were satisfied. If the
resignation had been anticipated, then Iraqis would have
adjusted their attitudes prior to August 14; in this case, our
analyses would underestimate the effect of the resignation
on public attitudes. However, the resignation was not a
fait accompli, as al-Maliki remained defiant against calls
for him to stand down even a day before he announced
his resignation (AFP 2014).
Although al-Maliki’s successor, al-Abadi, was also a
Shia Arab and a member of the same political party as al-
Maliki, he enjoyed much broader support among Sunni
Arabs when al-Maliki’s resignation was announced (Tay-
lor 2014; see SI, pp. 1–9). Thus, the sudden announcement
of al-Maliki’s resignation would be associated with the ex-
pectation of substantial changes in government policies
vis-à-vis Iraq’s largest minority.
Measurement
Our primary measure of sympathy for the violent opposi-
tion is based on the following survey question: “Thinking
about the reasons that armed opposition groups (mili-
tia, terrorist groups) used violence during the past year,
would you say that you in general have a lot of sympathy, a
little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for these armed op-
position groups?” Responses to this direct question were
measured on a 3-point ordinal scale ranging from “no
sympathy at all” to “a little sympathy” to “a lot of sym-
pathy” (in addition to the answer options “don’t know”
and “refused to answer”). Given that relatively few peo-
ple expressed “a lot of sympathy,” we collapsed “a little
sympathy” and “a lot of sympathy” into a single category,
but the results are robust to using a 3-point measure (see
SI Table 3). Supplementary analyses investigate an alter-
native measure based on respondents’ attitudes toward
violence by citizens against the Iraqi government (see SI
Table 8).
To investigate whether a decrease in sympathy for
armed opposition groups coincided with an improve-
ment in attitudes vis-à-vis the Iraqi government and a
rise in expectations of future security and public service
provision (performance legitimacy), we analyze four
additional dependent variables. The first one is based on
the following question: “How would you rate each of the
following institutions; very favorable, somewhat favor-
able, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable?” where
one institution is the federal government. Four options
were arranged on a scale ranging from “very unfavorable”
to “somewhat unfavorable” to “somewhat favorable”
to “very favorable” (in addition to “don’t know” and
“refused to answer”). Three questions (collapsed here for
convenience) on performance legitimacy probe expec-
tations of future security and public service provision:7
“In your opinion, how likely is it that the government
will improve conditions in your province in terms of
[security/jobs/electricity]?” The answer options were
“Not at all likely,” “not very likely,” “somewhat likely,”
“very likely,” “don’t know,” and “refused to answer.”
Two questions measured the government’s demo-
cratic legitimacy: “In your personal opinion, how likely
is it that you can influence government decisions?” and
“How would you describe the current situation of democ-
racy in Iraq?” Answer options were arranged on 4-point
scales.8 Supplementary analyses investigate alternative
measures of democratic legitimacy based on the respon-
dents’ self-reported ability to sign petitions, contact gov-
ernment officials, and run for office without fear.
Control variables include respondents’ self-reported
age, gender, education, employment status, economic sit-
uation, and size of hometown. Since insurgent tactics
could affect respondents’ opinions, we also control for vi-
olence in the interviewee’s governorate. We verified that
our results are robust to using seven alternative mea-
sures (see SI Tables 26–33): casualties and fatalities from
terrorist attacks (National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2017), insurgent
fatalities, civilian deaths, and fatalities on the government
side (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2017). The main
models control for violence in the respondent’s gover-
norate on the day of the interview or the previous day,
but the results are robust to controlling for violence over
a 4 week period. SI Table 1 reports descriptive statistics.
Model
The main models have the following OLS specification:
DV i = 0 + 1Ti + 2 Xi + 3 Zi
+ 4Ti ∗ Zi + 5 F E i + . (1)
The subscript i refers to the respondent. The DVi
measures her political attitudes. The binary treatment
7Sixty-nine percent of the respondents identified security, employ-
ment, or electricity as Iraq’s biggest problems. Therefore, these
were the most salient public goods and services the Iraqi govern-
ment could provide.
8The first scale ranged from “not at all likely” to “not very likely”
to “somewhat likely” to “very likely.” The second scale ranged
from “very bad” to “somewhat bad” to “somewhat good” to “very
good.” The other response options were “don’t know” and “refused
to answer.”
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variable, Ti , indicates whether the respondent was sur-
veyed before or after August 14. If the respondent was
interviewed after August 14, then Ti = 1. The variables
contained in Xi describe individual-level socioeconomic
characteristics and the local security situation, and the
measures contained in Zi designate respondents’ sectar-
ian and ethnic group affiliation. We interact Ti with these
sectarian/ethnic variables in order to investigate hetero-
geneity in the treatment effect across Iraq’s different com-
munities. We also include governorate fixed effects (F E i ).
For our main specifications, the standard errors are clus-
tered by governorate, and a wild bootstrap procedure with
10 million bootstrap replicates is used to account for the
relatively small number of clusters (Cameron, Gelbach,
and Miller 2008). The results hold in a robustness check
with standard errors clustered by district (see SI Tables
6– 7). We use OLS models for easier interpretation; how-
ever, the results from logit and ordered logit models are
consistent with those obtained from linear models (see SI
Tables 10– 11).
Results
As shown below, the announcement of the resignation of
the divisive prime minister al-Maliki decreased support
for violent opposition groups among Iraq’s Sunni Arab
minority. At the same time, Sunni Arabs assigned more
favorable ratings to the government after the resignation
than they did before, and they revised their expectation
of future security and public goods provision by the gov-
ernment upward. The finding that a major political event
that improves the perception of the government’s ability
and willingness to address popular grievances decreases
support for armed opposition groups is consistent with
our theoretical expectations derived from the hearts and
minds model.
Support for Armed Opposition and
Government’s Performance Legitimacy
During the first half of August (i.e., before the resignation
was announced) 52% of Sunni Arab respondents indi-
cated some or a lot of sympathy for armed opposition
groups. During the second half of August (i.e., imme-
diately after the announcement of the resignation) the
corresponding share dropped sharply to 27%. Bivariate
models in SI Table 2 indicate that this shift in attitudes
is statistically significant. This result holds when gover-
norate fixed effects and controls for respondent charac-
teristics and for the local security situation at the time
of the interview are included in the model (see Model 1
in Table 1). To glean from this model whether Sunni
Arab attitudes changed after al-Maliki announced his
resignation, we sum the coefficients for the resignation
measure and its interaction with Sunni Arab sectarian
affiliation. Using the estimates from Model 1, Figure 2
illustrates how sympathy for armed opposition groups
among Sunni Arab respondents dropped by almost 20
percentage points after the resignation was announced.
Sunni Arabs also became less favorable of the use of vi-
olence against the government in the wake of this event
(see SI Table 8). We find support for the proposition that
the effect of al-Maliki’s announced resignation on Sunni
Arabs’ sympathy for violent opposition groups was tied
to the impact of the same event on Sunni Arab attitudes
vis-à-vis the government. As can be seen in Figure 2,
after mid-August, Iraq’s largest displeased minority rated
the government higher and felt more optimistic about
the future provision of security, jobs, and electricity
by the government. These changes in Sunni Arab attitudes
were substantively and statistically significant. Sunni Arab
support for the government improved by about a quarter
of a standard deviation of the dependent variable, and
the jump in Sunni Arab expectations of electricity, jobs,
and security provision amounted to more than half, al-
most four-tenths, and one-third of a standard deviation,
respectively.
Our argument implies that the same Sunni Arabs
whose sympathy for armed opposition groups declined
in the wake of the announced resignation also improved
their rating of the government and their expectations of
future public service and security provision. Since every
respondent was only interviewed once, individual-level
data on change in attitudes are unavailable. Causal medi-
ation analyses cannot be conducted since the sequential
ignorability assumption is implausible in the context of
this study (Imai et al. 2011). The next best approach is
to analyze changes in the attitudes of subsets of Iraqi
Sunni Arabs to probe whether sympathy for the armed
opposition in each subset moved in the opposite direc-
tion as government ratings and expectations of future
public service and security provision. We divided Sunni
Arab respondents into eight subsets that vary by educa-
tional attainment and employment status. In five subsets,
change in all or three of the four measures of the gov-
ernment’s performance legitimacy has the opposite sign
as change in sympathy for armed opposition groups, as
expected (see SI Table 4). In all but one subset, at least
half of the measures of change in performance legitimacy
tended in the opposite direction as change in sympathy
for armed groups, as expected. For both subsets whose
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TABLE 1 Effect of al-Maliki’s Resignation on Attitudes vis-à-vis Armed Opposition and
Government’s Performance Legitimacy: Results from Governorate Fixed-Effects OLS
Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Sympathy with Rating of Security Jobs Electricity
Variable Armed Opp. Government Improves Improve Improves
Resign 0.073∗ −0.116 −0.103 −0.057 0.013
(0.035) (0.189) (0.143) (0.103) (0.072)
Sunni 0.225∗∗ −0.175 −0.507∗∗ −0.290∗∗ −0.328∗∗
(0.079) (0.127) (0.099) (0.049) (0.078)
Kurd 0.033 0.080 −0.162 0.098 0.216
(0.068) (0.317) (0.206) (0.141) (0.177)
Other 0.043 −0.086 −0.057 0.137 −0.060
(0.103) (0.259) (0.132) (0.163) (0.175)
Resign × Sunni −0.270∗∗ 0.377∗ 0.441∗∗ 0.371∗∗ 0.443∗∗
(0.051) (0.161) (0.114) (0.087) (0.145)
Resign × Kurd −0.142∗∗ 0.382 0.130 0.225 −0.063
(0.048) (0.222) (0.164) (0.149) (0.208)
Resign × Other −0.141 0.022 −0.003 −0.046 0.324
(0.097) (0.277) (0.146) (0.206) (0.182)
Casualties −0.004 0.006 0.002 −0.001∗ −0.001∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Female −0.035 −0.136∗ 0.034 0.012 0.019
(0.025) (0.060) (0.058) (0.060) (0.067)
Education: junior high 0.011 0.185∗ −0.104 0.171 0.153∗
(0.042) (0.072) (0.082) (0.101) (0.076)
Education: senior high 0.005 0.245∗ −0.141∗ 0.084 0.102
(0.049) (0.096) (0.065) (0.085) (0.095)
Education: university −0.056 0.017 −0.237∗∗ 0.060 0.160
(0.031) (0.098) (0.074) (0.080) (0.105)
Urban: 50k–250k −0.045 −0.102 −0.050 −0.088 −0.192
(0.066) (0.323) (0.162) (0.182) (0.138)
Urban: < 50k −0.042 −0.170 −0.069 −0.114 −0.185∗∗
(0.103) (0.300) (0.194) (0.156) (0.056)
Rural −0.009 −0.009 0.023 −0.038 −0.058
(0.079) (0.337) (0.111) (0.142) (0.069)
Unemployed −0.093 −0.242 −0.118 −0.130∗ −0.009
(0.056) (0.177) (0.067) (0.060) (0.095)
Not gainfully empl. −0.087∗ −0.105 −0.064 −0.127 −0.056
(0.044) (0.088) (0.042) (0.068) (0.053)
Good econ. situation 0.001 −0.098 0.152∗ 0.064 0.034
(0.041) (0.083) (0.063) (0.107) (0.083)
Constant 0.317∗∗ 2.39∗∗ 2.33∗∗ 2.31∗∗ 2.82∗∗
(0.112) (0.315) (0.234) (0.215) (0.137)
Governorate fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Four age controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,302 1,216 1,396 1,406 1,430
R-squared 0.131 0.198 0.335 0.084 0.216
Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. N varies across models due to missing
values on dependent variables. ∗∗p < .01, ∗p < .05.
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FIGURE 2 Estimated Change in Sunni Arab and Shia Arab
Attitudes after al-Maliki’s Announced Resignation
Note: The figure displays the estimated change in Sunni Arab and Shia Arab attitudes
derived from Models 1–7 (with 95% confidence intervals). The upper panel shows that
Sunni Arab sympathy for armed opposition groups declined, whereas Sunni Arab ratings
of the government and Sunni Arab expectations of future public service delivery improved;
in contrast, most Shia Arab attitudes did not significantly change. The estimated change in
sympathy with armed opposition groups appears smaller than the other attitudinal shifts
due to different scales. SI Figure 1 displays all results on a common scale. The lower panel
indicates that the announced resignation did not significantly alter Sunni Arab and Shia
Arab perceptions of the government’s process legitimacy.
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sympathy for the armed opposition tended to increase
after the prime minister’s resignation was announced,
the estimated change in government ratings is negatively
signed, as expected. Overall, the same subsets of Sunni
Arabs whose attitudes vis-à-vis armed opposition groups
deteriorated also tended to improve their ratings of the
government and their expectations of future public ser-
vice delivery.
We examine Shia Arab and Kurdish respondents’ at-
titudes in order to rule out that the changes in Sunni
Arab attitudes also materialized among other ethnic and
sectarian groups. A change across all communities would
be more consistent with alternative explanations such as
a honeymoon effect than with our argument. Impor-
tantly, we do not detect differences between trends in
Sunni Arab, Shia Arab, and Kurdish attitudes during the
3 months before the prime minister’s resignation was an-
nounced (see SI Table 35). In line with our argument, we
find that the decline in sympathy with violent opposition
groups after this event only unfolded among members
of the displeased Sunni Arab minority that improved its
expectations of future public goods and service provi-
sion by the government as well as its opinion about the
government. The announced resignation did not strongly
affect the attitudes of the Shia Arab majority, which was
the main constituency of the outgoing and the incom-
ing prime ministers. The coefficient of the resignation
measure, which indicates whether the respondent was in-
terviewed before or after August 14, indicates the effect
of the announced resignation among Shia Arabs, who
form the baseline group. It shows that the announce-
ment of the resignation potentially led to an increase
in Shia Arab sympathies with armed opposition groups,
which is estimated at 7 percentage points in Model 1
but is insignificant in several robustness checks reported
below. At the same time, Shia Arab attitudes vis-à-vis
the government and their expectations of future security
and public service provision did not significantly change
(Models 2–5).
The announced resignation also did not greatly affect
Kurdish attitudes. Kurdish respondents rated the federal
government higher but did not significantly change their
attitudes on the other four outcome measures. These find-
ings are consistent with our understanding of the Iraqi
Kurdish ethnic group and its relationship to the federal
government. Ninety-two percent of the Kurdish respon-
dents in our main sample live in areas administered by
the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), which pro-
vides electricity and public sector jobs in Iraqi Kurdistan
and has its own security forces. Therefore, we would not
expect a change in the Iraqi prime minister to trans-
form Kurdish perceptions of public goods provision by
the government, as Kurdish respondents view the KRG as
the primary provider of public services and security.
Government’s Democratic Legitimacy
So far, we have provided evidence to show that the change
in attitude of Sunni Arabs toward violent opposition
groups in the wake of al-Maliki’s announced resignation
was related to the government’s improved performance
legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqi Sunni Arabs, which stems
from their expectation of improved provision of security
and public services by the government. The results do
not imply that Sunni Arab perceptions of process legiti-
macy, which reflects a change in the expected processes
of government decision making, also improved. Table 2
indicates the results of analyses of the effect of the prime
minister’s announced resignation on perceptions of the
situation of democracy and the ability to influence gov-
ernment decisions. Before al-Maliki announced his resig-
nation, Sunni Arabs assessed the situation of democracy
in bleaker terms than Shia Arabs. As Figure 2 shows,
after al-Maliki announced his resignation, neither Sunni
Arabs nor Shia Arabs significantly changed their attitudes
on this topic, nor did they revise their assessment of the
ability to influence government decisions. This is not sur-
prising considering that al-Maliki’s successor, al-Abadi,
was also a Shia Arab from the same party. SI Table 9
presents results from three models with alternative mea-
sures of process legitimacy based on citizens’ ability to sign
petitions, contact government officials, and run for office
without fear, which are consistent with those reported
here. Overall, these results do not support the argument
that al-Maliki’s announced resignation improved popular
perceptions of democratic legitimacy. Along with the re-
sults in Table 1, our findings suggest that Sunni Arabs did
not expect the emergence of a new system of governance,
but instead believed that the new government would only
better address their grievances by more effectively pro-
viding public goods and services.
Alternative Explanations
Although the empirical evidence is consistent with the
argument derived from the hearts and minds model, it
does not support three plausible alternative explanations
of the observed shift in public attitudes. First, the results
do not merely reflect a transitory “honeymoon effect”
that is often observed when a new leader is elected. This
effect can be explained by favorable media coverage due
to temporary deference to the new leader’s democratic
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TABLE 2 Effect of al-Maliki’s Resignation on Democratic Legitimacy: Results from Governorate
Fixed Effects OLS Models
(6) (7)
Dependent Influence Govt. Situation of
Variable Decisions Democracy
Resign −0.080 0.068
(0.090) (0.045)
Sunni −0.188 −0.196∗
(0.123) (0.091)
Kurd 0.036 −0.091
(0.181) (0.247)
Other −0.316 −0.275
(0.163) (0.145)
Resign × Sunni 0.117 −0.081
(0.095) (0.105)
Resign × Kurd 0.015 −0.177∗
(0.125) (0.090)
Resign × Other 0.111 −0.188
(0.216) (0.337)
Casualties 0.001 −0.008
(0.001) (0.001)
Female −0.112 −0.017
(0.078) (0.055)
Education: junior high 0.060 0.033
(0.070) (0.120)
Education: senior high 0.056 0.082
(0.147) (0.124)
Education: university −0.007 −0.108
(0.127) (0.159)
Urban: 50k–250k −0.050 0.027
(0.158) (0.153)
Urban: < 50k −0.335∗ −0.056
(0.134) (0.094)
Rural −0.086 0.012
(0.170) (0.112)
Unemployed −0.166 −0.038
(0.125) (0.092)
Not gainfully empl. −0.235∗∗ −0.079
(0.065) (0.071)
Good econ. situation 0.013 0.041
(0.100) (0.045)
Constant 2.32∗∗ 2.42∗∗
(0.121) (0.219)
Governorate fixed effects Yes Yes
Four age controls Yes Yes
Observations 1,301 1,337
R-squared 0.177 0.150
Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. N varies across models due to missing
values on dependent variables. ∗∗p < .01; ∗p < .05.
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election (Brody 1991, 28–30). Therefore, we would not
expect a new leader to benefit from this effect if he is
not elected. If the effect materialized even in the absence
of a democratic election, it should affect the attitudes of
all Iraqi news media consumers—and not just those of
Sunni Arabs. Moreover, to the extent to which a honey-
moon effect influences not just government ratings but
also other political attitudes, it would likely be captured
in measures of the government’s performance and pro-
cess legitimacy, and yet the latter did not change in the
wake of the announced resignation. Finally, the “honey-
moon effect” is inherently fleeting (Brody 1991, 32), but
al-Abadi’s approval rating among Sunni Arabs remained
consistently high in national polls conducted between
2014 and 2018 (see SI Table 34).
Second, it is implausible that the realignment of
Sunni Arab attitudes during the month of August oc-
curred due to a shift in expectations of who would win the
civil war, which might stem from renewed U.S. support
to the incoming government. In hindsight, the leadership
transition marked the beginning of a gradual U.S. reen-
gagement, which eventually helped the Iraqi government
turn the tide in the civil war against ISIS in 2015 and 2016.
However, in the late summer of 2014, this was far from ob-
vious. In the second half of August, the war was viewed as
steadily tipping in the militants’ favor, and Iraq’s political
elite feared that the United States would not try to prevent
the fall of Baghdad (Chulov and Hawramy 2014), even
after President Barack Obama authorized limited U.S.
airstrikes to protect American diplomats and military ad-
visers in Erbil and Baghdad on August 7. ISIS continued
a series of victories against the government in September
and October (Roggio and Adaki 2014). Evidence from
the survey confirms that Sunni Arab assessments of the
security situation did not improve after the announce-
ment of U.S. strikes (see SI Table 12); consequently, they
cannot explain the shift in Sunni Arab attitudes vis-à-
vis the government and the armed opposition. Moreover,
we show below and in the supporting information (pp.
95–96) that the major event that shifted Sunni Arab atti-
tudes occurred in mid-August—that is, at the time when
al-Maliki announced his resignation and not in early Au-
gust when the United States announced limited airstrikes.
Although the airstrikes by themselves cannot explain the
change in Sunni Arab attitudes toward armed opposition
groups, Sunni Arabs may still have updated their beliefs
based on the airstrikes in a way that might reinforce the
effect stemming from al-Maliki’s announced resignation.
Finally, while the results are consistent with the hearts
and minds model, they do not support an alternative ex-
planation based on zero-sum sectarianism. Sectarianism
in the contemporary Middle East is sometimes described
as a zero-sum game, in which each sectarian group views
a gain for the other as a loss for itself (Matthiesen 2014).
Zero-sum sectarianism would imply that a major political
event shifts the attitudes of Iraqi Shia Arabs and Sunni
Arabs in opposite directions. Contrary to this expectation,
Sunni Arab and Shia Arab attitudes did not significantly
move in opposite directions on six of the seven measures
examined above.
Robustness
Date of the Critical Event
Although the announcement of al-Maliki’s resignation
was a seminal event, many notable developments took
place in Iraq in August 2014. In order to verify that
al-Maliki’s resignation—and not some other event—
triggered the shift in Sunni Arab attitudes, we estimated
40 OLS models with different samples composed of re-
sponses gathered between July and September. For each
regression, Ti was redefined so that a different day delim-
its treatment and control groups. Each model includes all
interviews that were conducted within a 30-day time pe-
riod; the responses collected during the first 15 days serve
as the control group, and the remainder constitutes the
treatment group. For instance, the sample for the model
where the cutoff corresponds to August 1 includes all re-
sponses gathered between July 17 and July 31 (control
group) and responses provided between August 1 and
August 15 (treatment group). If Iraqi attitudes changed
in response to an event on August 14, then the effect size
and the precision of the estimate should be relatively high
when this date marks the cutoff.
The change in Sunni Arab attitudes estimated from
all 40 models is presented in Figure 3. For the first few
regressions, the samples do not contain any respondents
from the actual treatment group (i.e., those interviewed
after the resignation was announced), and therefore it
is not surprising that no significant change in attitudes
is found. As the samples move forward, parts of the ac-
tual treatment group start to be included in the treatment
group in the regressions, and the estimates start to become
negative and significant. In the model where Ti indicates
whether an interview was conducted before or after Au-
gust 14, the estimated coefficient and its significance are
relatively high, as expected. However, after August 14,
the effect slowly moves back to being indistinguishable
from zero as the actual treatment group starts to populate
both the treatment and control groups in the regressions.
The most significant coefficients are thus placed sym-
metrically around August 14. These results increase our
confidence that our main analyses capture the effect of an
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FIGURE 3 Results from 40 OLS Models of the Date on which Sunni Arab Attitudes Changed
Note: The upper panel depicts the point estimates (with 95% confidence intervals) of the treatment effect for Sunni Arabs in 40 OLS models
with the same specifications as Model 1. The x-axis indicates the day that constitutes the cutoff between treatment and control group in
each model. The relatively high significance of the coefficient in the model where August 14 (designated by a dashed line) is the cutoff
indicates that a critical event that strongly influenced Sunni Arab attitudes vis-à-vis armed opposition groups occurred in mid-August,
when al-Maliki announced his resignation. The lower left panel displays the sample sizes for the 40 models. It shows that the coefficient
is highly significant in mid-August even though the sample size and statistical power are relatively small at that point. The bottom right
panel indicates the shares of respondents in each sample’s treatment and control groups who are correctly classified into these treatment
conditions if the critical event occurred on August 14. The higher these proportions are, the larger and the more significant is the estimated
change in Sunni attitudes shown in the upper panel. This supports the conclusion that the change in Sunni Arab attitudes occurred on or
in close temporal proximity to August 14.
important event that occurred in mid-August—such as
the announced resignation of a divisive prime minister.
Larger and Smaller Samples
As a robustness check, we replicate the main models with
a sample that includes all responses that were gathered
within 3 weeks before or after the prime minister’s resig-
nation was announced on August 14. This sample includes
43% more observations than the main sample. Even so,
the results on the difference between the effect of al-
Maliki’s announced resignation on Shia Arab and Sunni
Arab attitudes hold (see SI Tables 13– 14). Another ro-
bustness check only includes responses that were gathered
within 2 weeks from the day when the prime minister’s
resignation was announced. This sample is 10% smaller
than the main sample, but it yields substantively the same
results (see SI Tables 16– 17).
In order to show that our results are not being driven
by the varying nonresponse rates for each question that
was used to construct the five dependent variables, we
replicate the analyses on a sample of respondents who
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answered all five questions. SI Table 19 shows that we
obtain similar results.
Covariate Balance
While the as-if random assignment of respondents to the
treatment or control group ensures that the character-
istics of these groups are equal in expectation, a regres-
sion of the treatment status on all covariates in the main
models confirms that these groups are not systematically
different on determinants of political attitudes such as
education level and age, conditional on governorate fixed
effects. The only imbalances on control variables con-
sist in a slightly smaller share of women, unemployed,
and residents of midsize towns in the treatment group
than in the control group (see SI Table 48). Therefore, all
models control for gender, employment status, and size
of hometown. Moreover, the sample with all responses
gathered within ±21 days is fully balanced on all control
variables; therefore, covariate imbalance is an implausible
explanation of the findings.
The characteristics of respondents who were inter-
viewed in August (i.e., respondents in the main sam-
ple) are not systematically different from those who took
the survey during other months. We regressed a binary
indicator of whether a respondent was interviewed in
August on all covariates; as expected, the coefficients of
all covariates from our survey are insignificant (see SI
Table 48).
Potential Bias from Nonresponses and
Direct Questions
Respondents effectively selected into the sample by
choosing informative answer options rather than declin-
ing to indicate an attitude. Moreover, the direct question
technique may introduce social desirability bias if it made
some respondents reluctant to honestly reveal their atti-
tudes. As long as respondents in the treatment and control
groups did not use different logics of self-selection,
nonresponses did not confound the estimate of the res-
ignation’s effect. Similarly, social desirability bias would
only invalidate our estimate of the effect of the resigna-
tion if the likelihood that respondents misrepresented
their attitudes systematically changed after this event. A
series of tests examine these potential biases. First, the
rate at which respondents refused to answer or stated
that they “don’t know” did not systematically change
after the resignation was announced (see SI Tables 49–
50). Second, respondents who declined to indicate their
attitudes before August 14 had similar characteristics as
those who did so at a later date (see SI Tables 51– 52).
Third, the announced resignation did not change Shia
Arab or Sunni Arab respondents’ choices to conduct the
interview inside their home and to be alone with the enu-
merators during the interview (see SI Table 53). Fourth,
the same enumerators administered interviews before
and after the resignation was announced, and we do not
find enumerator gender effects before or after that event
(see SI Tables 61– 63). In conclusion, we do not detect
any evidence of a systematic change in social desirability
bias after the announcement of the prime minister’s
resignation, which would bias our estimate of the effect
of that event. Finally, we replicate our analyses on two
subsets of respondents who are least likely to exhibit
social desirability bias. Our results hold when we drop re-
spondents who took the survey outside their home where
others might overhear the interview (see SI Tables 54–
55) and when we exclude those who were not alone with
enumerators during the interview (see SI Tables 56– 57).
Persistence of Effects over Time
By analyzing Iraqi attitudes in August, the main models
only capture a short-term effect of the prime minister’s
resignation. In order to verify whether the effects last
beyond August, we included the responses gathered in
September in the analyses and added a binary measure to
the regressions that indicates whether a respondent was
interviewed in August or September. The results from
the main models hold for these augmented regressions,
and furthermore, Sunni Arab attitudes did not change
between late August (after the resignation) and Septem-
ber (see SI Table 20). Thus, the change in attitudes lasted
at least until September. We cannot use our survey to
investigate whether the effect persisted after data gath-
ering was completed in September. However, evidence
from national polls conducted between 2014 and 2018
shows that al-Abadi’s job approval among Sunni Arabs
remained high throughout this period (see SI Table 34).
Weighted OLS Regressions
The investigated samples are not representative because
their composition is a function of the as-if randomly
determined timing of the interviews. Although reesti-
mating our main models with survey weights cannot en-
tirely resolve the lack of representativeness (because a
few governorates are absent from all three samples), it
helps demonstrate that the results are not being driven
by the idiosyncratic composition of the samples. We rees-
timate the main models with observations weighted by
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governorate and by district, respectively. The results from
the main models hold (see SI Tables 22– 25).
Discussion and Conclusion
The hearts and minds model of combating rebellions indi-
cates that a population is less likely to support violent op-
position groups if it is satisfied with the provision of public
goods and services by the government. It implies that a
large exogenous shock that alters perceptions of future
public service and security provision by the government
also changes both popular perceptions of the government
and support of violent groups. The announcement of the
resignation of the divisive Iraqi prime minister al-Maliki
on August 14, 2014, was such an event. Data from an orig-
inal survey administered in 17 of Iraq’s 18 governorates
during the summer of 2014 enable us to test the proposi-
tion that this seminal event influenced Iraqi Sunni Arab
attitudes vis-à-vis the government and armed opposition
groups. By comparing responses provided immediately
before and after the resignation was announced, we find
that Sunni Arabs became less sympathetic to violent op-
position groups after this event. At the same time, the
announcement of the resignation rendered Sunni Arabs
more optimistic about future public service and security
provision by the government. Moreover, Sunni Arabs as-
signed more favorable ratings to the government in the
wake of this event. These results indicate that a counterin-
surgent can win over the hearts and minds of members
of a displeased group if it credibly signals to the group
that it will improve on delivering the most salient public
goods and services.
Iraqi Shia Arabs became slightly more sympathetic
to violent opposition groups (although this result is not
robust across several specifications) after al-Maliki’s res-
ignation, whereas their opinion about the government
and their expectations of future public service provision
by the government did not change. This gives us further
confidence that the observed shift in attitudes is due to
the dynamic described by the hearts and minds model
and is not simply a function of zero-sum sectarian poli-
tics, which would imply that Shia Arab and Sunni Arab
attitudes move in opposite directions on more than just
one dimension.
The findings show that neither side of the policy de-
bate in mid-2014 on whether al-Maliki should resign cor-
rectly anticipated the consequences of such leadership
change. While some experts doubted that it would win
over Sunni Arab hearts and minds (e.g., Hanna 2014),
proponents of the resignation emphasized that increased
process legitimacy could turn Sunni Arab support away
from ISIS and toward the government (Duefler, quoted
in PBS 2014). In contrast, we show that Sunni Arab as-
sessments of the government’s representativeness did not
improve after al-Maliki announced his resignation. Our
results indicate that the shift in Sunni Arab attitudes is
consistent with rising perceptions of performance legiti-
macy and not process legitimacy among this minority in
the wake of the announced leadership transition.
These findings shed new light on the question of
whether civilians in civil war theaters alter their opinion
about warring factions based on retrospective or prospec-
tive assessments of the parties’ conduct. The literature on
the effect of civilian casualties on public attitudes leaves
open the question of whether the effect stems from the dis-
approval of past harm or from an update of expectations
of future casualties. Studies on the effect of development
programs on popular support for militants specify con-
flicting expectations: Khanna and Zimmermann (2015,
3) reason that “actual and especially the expected future
benefits” from a public works program incite civilian col-
laboration with the counterinsurgency, whereas Crost,
Felter, and Johnston (2014, 1852) argue that insurgents
sabotage a development program because “successful im-
plementation would increase popular support for the gov-
ernment.” Although a lack of data on civilian attitudes or
behavior prevents a direct test of these conflicting hy-
potheses in these earlier studies, this study shows that a
signal about future public service and security provision
by the government can change civilian attitudes in the
conflict theater even before government policy changes.
One caveat is that this study only examines the short-
term effect of the announcement of al-Maliki’s resigna-
tion. The design of this study does not enable us to mea-
sure whether the departure of the divisive prime minister
led to a lasting or transient change in Sunni Arab attitudes.
Indeed, our argument implies that the shift in attitudes
does not persist if the new government fails to satisfy the
displeased minorities’ expectations of improved public
service and security delivery. Even so, it is remarkable
that during an ongoing civil war, the nomination of a
new prime minister for a still Shia Arab-dominated gov-
ernment caused a sharp decline in Sunni Arab support
for armed opposition groups in Iraq. Moreover, subse-
quent surveys indicate that the increase in Sunni Arab
support for the government in the wake of the leadership
transition persisted for several years (see SI Table 34).
The main policy implication from the findings for
the Iraqi government is that it can impair the ability of
armed groups to win the hearts and minds of Sunni Arabs
by improving the provision of the most salient public
goods (especially security) and services to them. The
results suggest that many Sunni Arabs are not supporting
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violent groups (e.g., ISIS) for ideological reasons and are
willing to switch their support away from such groups if
a Shia Arab-led government effectively signals that it will
respond to their grievances. The primary implication
for Iraq’s development assistance providers is that aid
that improves the government’s willingness or ability
to provide public services and security and that renders
Sunni Arabs more optimistic about future public goods
provision by the state can reduce popular support for
armed opposition groups in Iraq.
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